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Abstract. Brexit and the Future UK-EU Trade Relationship. Confronting the 
Challenges 
Since the EU referendum took place in June 2016, the British 
government’s task to implementing the vote to leave the EU has been 
monumental. With regard to the future trade relationship with the EU27, 
the British government has proposed a ‘bold and ambitious’ free trade 
agreement aimed at the ‘freest and most frictionless trade possible’. The 
complexity of achieving such an agreement within the limited timeframe 
available has generated lot of controversy, uncertainty and anxiety. The 
aim of the paper is to bring some clarity with regard to the challenges 
ahead. A proper appreciation of these challenges is key in order for a 
transparent, inclusive and realistic debate about the objectives, features 
and timeframe of the future UK-EU trade agreement. 
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Since the European Union (EU) referendum took place in June 2016, 
the British government’s task to implementing the vote to leave the EU 
has been monumental. The debate about the future trade relationship 
between the United Kingdom (UK) and the remaining 27 Member States 
of the EU (EU27) has been particularly controversial and has generated a 
high level of anxiety within business and the wider public. On the one 
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hand, the British government has relatively quickly drawn the so-called 
«Brexit red-lines» that will guide any future relationship (including trade) 
between the UK and the EU27. These red-lines include retaining control 
over immigration, control over law-making, control over global trade 
policy and freedom from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the 
EU). The red-lines have remained relatively unchanged – 
notwithstanding the various calls to modify (and particularly to soften) 
them.  
At the same time, the British government has emphasised the 
importance of trade for the UK economy, particularly trade in services. 
Services represent almost 80% of the UK GDP and roughly half of the 
UK total exports. Crucially, the UK enjoys a substantial trade surplus 
when it comes to services (particularly financial services). Accordingly, in 
order to reassure business (and the wider public) that there will be no 
dramatic changes in the regulatory framework under which they 
currently operate, the British government has called for «the freest and 
most frictionless trade possible in goods and services» with the EU after 
Brexit.1 However, as clearly indicated by the British Prime Minister, the 
UK will not seek to retain membership of the EU Single Market (and 
Customs Union) but will instead pursue «a bold and ambitious» free 
trade agreement (FTA) with the EU.2 Recognising that a traditional FTA 
would represent a marked restriction on the market access that currently 
exists between the UK and other EU Members States, the Prime 
Minister has recently called for ‘imagination’ and ‘creativity’ in designing 
the future FTA with the EU273. 
                     
1 HM Government, Future Customs Arrangements: A Future Partnership Paper 
(August 2017). 
2 Prime Minister’s Lancaster House Speech, The government's negotiating objectives 
for exiting the EU (17 January 2017). See also Prime Minister’s Letter to Donald Tusk 
triggering Article 50 TFEU (29 March 2017). 
3 Prime Minister’s Florence Speech, A new era of cooperation and partnership between 
the UK and the EU (22 September 2017). 
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Controversy and related anxiety are linked, at least in part, with the 
complexity of achieving such a ‘bold and ambitious’ FTA within the 
limited timeframe available (currently by 29 March 2019). The aim of the 
paper is thus to bring some clarity with regard to the challenges ahead. A 
proper appreciation of these challenges is key in order for a transparent, 
inclusive and realistic debate about the objectives, features and 
timeframe of the future UK-EU trade agreement. 
 
1. The function of trade agreements: combatting ‘protectionism’ and 
addressing ‘regulatory diversity’ 
 
Multilateral trade agreements (such as the World Trade Organisation, 
WTO) or bilateral trade agreements (such as the several hundred FTAs) 
are primarily aimed at combatting protectionism, that is government 
measures restricting international trade with the intent of protecting local 
business from foreign competition. For example, trade agreements 
address clear protectionist measures by (a) reducing or eliminating tariffs and 
quotas on trade in goods, and (b) prohibiting formally discriminatory 
laws and regulation affecting trade in goods or services. Trade 
agreements also address hidden protectionist measures by (a) prohibiting 
materially discriminatory laws and regulation including taxes, (b) 
imposing general substantive standards (for example, ‘sanitary measures’ 
need to be based on scientific evidence and ‘technical regulations’ need 
to be the least trade restrictive options reasonably available), or (c) 
imposing general procedural requirements (such as transparency in the 
regulatory processes, or ‘notice and comment’ on new proposed 
legislation). 
More recently trade agreements have attempted to deal with regulatory 
diversity, that is the differences in regulation across States creating 
burdensome multiplication of regulatory requirements, such as multiple 
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safety standards for products or multiple licensing requirements for 
service providers. In principle, there are several instruments to address 
regulatory diversity, including: (a) recognition arrangements, whereby 
two or more countries agree to recognise either each other’s conformity 
assessment procedures or each other’s standards; (b) harmonisation of 
regulation, either through references to existing international standards, 
or through common (sectoral) disciplines; (c) supranational law making, 
supervisory and enforcement permanent institutions. 
Depending on the extent to which countries are willing to address 
protectionism and regulatory diversity, one can distinguish between 
‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ integration4. The WTO, as well as FTAs, fall in the 
shallow integration category as they mainly focus on partially and 
progressively eliminating tariffs and quotas, as well as prohibiting 
discrimination. On the other hand, the classic form of deep integration is 
the common (or single) market (as in the case of the EU), which 
involves the elimination of all protectionist measures and is aimed at 
reducing a wider set of regulatory barriers to trade (including services) 
through supranational harmonisation, regulation, and supervision. For 
example, with regard to financial services, the WTO mainly provides for 
partial market access and national treatment commitments, subject to 
broad prudential regulation carve-outs whereas in the EU, in addition to 
a general prohibition of any form of nationality discrimination and any 
unreasonable barrier to intra-community trade in services, there exists a 
complex system of supranational regulation, supervision and 
enforcement aimed at a high level of integration. 
However, while there are marked differences between the EU Single 
Market and WTO/FTAs in terms of objectives and approaches, when it 
comes to actual achievements on the ground, those differences appear to 
                     
4 F. Ortino, Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of EC and 
WTO Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004. 
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diminish somewhat. Particularly with regard to services, the 
‘incompleteness’ or ‘un-singleness’ of the Single Market is the most 
evident, at least in some service sectors5. Trade integration across the EU 
(defined as the average of intra-EU imports and exports divided by 
GDP) is considerably smaller for services than for goods (6% vs 22%)6. 
 
2. Main features of services FTAs 
 
The general structure and content of those FTAs that include 
chapters on trade in services (so called ‘services FTAs’) is very similar to 
the GATS, the General Agreement on Trade in Services, which is part of 
the WTO. Accordingly, while the scope of application is in principle very 
broad including measures affecting both cross-border trade and foreign 
direct investment in services, the key obligations remain relatively 
limited, particularly in terms of the type of disciplines included in the 
FTA to tackle regulatory barriers to trade in services. Like the GATS, 
services FTAs principally focus on non-discrimination standards (both 
MFN and National Treatment), transparency requirements, 
administrative due process standards, and the prohibition of a limited set 
of ‘market access’ limitations (such as limitations on the number of 
service suppliers or service operations, or limitations on the participation 
of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage or total value). Many 
of these provisions only apply to the extent that a contracting party has 
been willing to commit a specific service sector or sub-sector in its 
Schedule of commitments or/and subject to the conditions and 
limitations inscribed by the contracting party in its Schedule. Like the 
                     
5 See F. Erixon – R. Georgieva, What is wrong with the Single Market?, ECIPE Working 
Paper, 1/2016, p. 2, http://ecipe.org/app/uploads/2016/02/5Freedoms-012016-
paper_fixed_v2.pdf. 
6 European Commission, Single Market Integration and Competitiveness Report 2016, 
at 110 (http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/20210). 
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GATS, services FTAs provide, next to the general framework, for a few 
sector-specific disciplines (often in separate chapters) addressing for 
example, financial or telecommunication services7. 
There are however, certain distinctive features of services FTAs that 
should be highlighted. 
First, service obligations in FTAs are invariably part of a broader set 
of disciplines that, in addition to traditional issues regarding trade in 
goods (such as, tariffs binding, technical standards, and subsidies) 
include areas that are not found in the WTO (at least not to the same 
extent). These are, for example, ‘investment’, ‘competition’, ‘sustainable 
development’8. 
Second, FTAs have produced some innovations with regard to 
scheduling approaches. While many FTAs follow the GATS approach of 
undertaking commitments on the basis of a positive list (subject to 
conditions or limitations), several FTAs have adopted the NAFTA 
approach of undertaking commitments on the basis of a negative list, 
whereby liberalisation commitments extend to all sectors except those 
that are expressly identified in the schedules of the participating 
members. The negative list approach has the advantage of being more 
transparent and predictable as the excluded sectors (as well as the non-
conforming measures) need to be expressly identified in the respective 
members’ schedules.  
Third, while FTAs do not generally include innovations in terms of 
the type of disciplines tackling regulatory barriers to trade in services 
compared to those found in the GATS, some of the most recent FTAs 
do try to add to the GATS disciplines. The 2016 EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) provides a 
                     
7 See F. Ortino, Regional Trade Agreements and Trade in Services, in S. Lester et al. (eds), 
Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: Commentary and Analysis, Cambridge, cambridge 
University Press, 20152, pp. 213-244. 
8 These are respectively chapters 8, 17 and 22 of the EU-Canada CETA, signed in 2016. 
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good example of a trade agreement attempting to add some disciplines 
addressing regulatory measures (including regulatory diversity) affecting 
trade in services. Chapter 21 of CETA on ‘Regulatory Cooperation’ aims 
to (1) «build trust, deepen mutual understanding of regulatory 
governance and obtain from each other the benefit of expertise and 
perspectives»9 and (2) «contribute to the improvement of 
competitiveness and efficiency of industry in a way that (i) minimises 
administrative costs whenever possible; (ii) reduces duplicative regulatory 
requirements and consequential compliance costs whenever possible; 
and (iii) pursues compatible regulatory approaches including, if possible 
and appropriate, through (A) the application of regulatory approaches 
which are technology-neutral; and (B) the recognition of equivalence or 
the promotion of convergence». However, Chapter 21 includes mostly 
best endeavour provisions focusing on process requirements and is 
excluded from the general State-State dispute settlement mechanism. 
Fourth, services FTAs provide for additional level of market access 
and national treatment commitments compared to the commitments 
found in GATS schedules. Studies show that both the sectoral coverage 
and depth of market access and national treatment commitments 
achieved in FTAs with regard to either cross-border trade (mode 1) and 
commercial presence (mode 3) is on average more than double than that 
achieved by existing GATS commitments10. 
 
 
 
 
                     
9 The aim is «to (i) improve the planning and development of regulatory proposals; (ii) 
promote transparency and predictability in the development and establishment of 
regulations; (iii) enhance the efficacy of regulations; (iv) identify alternative instruments; 
(v) recognise the associated impacts of regulations; (vi) avoid unnecessary regulatory 
differences; and (vii) improve regulatory implementation and compliance», Art. 21.3(b). 
10 Marchetti & Roy, p. 81. 
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3. Three options for an ambitious services FTA between UK-EU 
 
Given the ‘Brexit red lines’ mentioned above and despite the wishes 
of the current British government, the future UK-EU trade relationship 
will be at best a ‘EU-Canada CETA-plus’ rather than a ‘EU Single 
Market-minus’. There exist three concrete options to improve CETA 
when it comes to trade in services in the future UK-EU FTA. 
First, a goal for the future UK-EU FTA would be to agree full market 
access and national treatment commitments across all (or most) service 
sectors. As noted above, ‘full market access’ would prohibit certain 
quantitative limitations (as listed, for example, in Art XVI GATS) and 
‘full national treatment’ would prohibit any (direct and indirect) 
discrimination based on the origin of the service or service supplier. This 
is something certainly achievable (as it would reflect the current situation 
under EU single market rules) and it would constitute a first in the 
context of a service FTA. 
A second goal for the future UK-EU FTA would be to include both 
procedural and substantive standards, applicable on so called ‘domestic 
regulation’, which includes in particular all measures of general 
application affecting trade in services and measures relating to 
qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and 
licensing requirements. Among the procedural standards, two should be 
highlighted: 
– First, the service chapter of the future UK-EU FTA should include 
‘notice and comment’ requirements, so that each party shall (a) publish in 
advance any measure of general application that it proposes to adopt and 
the purpose of the regulation, and (b) provide both interested persons 
and the other party with an opportunity to comment on that proposed 
regulation (TPP, Art 11.13.3). 
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– A second set of procedural standards should relate to certain basic 
due process requirements applicable, for example, to qualification and 
licensing procedures. According to such standards, a party’s regulatory 
authority shall (a) make an administrative decision on a complete 
application relating to the supply of a service within a specified term (say 
3 months), (b) promptly notify the applicant of the decision, and (c) on 
request of an unsuccessful applicant, shall inform the applicant of the 
reasons for denial of the application (TPP, Art 11.13.10). 
With regard to substantive standards, the future UK-EU FTA should 
include the requirement that domestic regulation should be ‘not more 
burdensome than necessary’. In other words, efficient regulation would 
be that which minimizes compliance costs (on the regulated service 
providers) while maximising the positive effects on welfare (such as 
consumer protection or financial stability). Such requirement is often 
referred to as the ‘necessity test’ or ‘cost-effectiveness analysis’ and it 
compares the relative costs and effects of different regulatory options. 
Whether a party choses to regulate for a specific public purpose and the 
specific level of protection chosen by that party remain under the 
discretion of that party. However, the FTA would require each party to 
adopt the most efficient regulatory measure to achieve the chosen level 
of protection. 
A third goal for a future UK-EU FTA revolves around tackling 
regulatory diversity. While the intent of the UK is to replicate the acquis 
communautaire upon Brexit, that cannot be taken as legally relevant in the 
context of negotiating a future FTA between the UK and the EU, as 
long as and to the extent that the future FTA itself contains such a 
requirement (which is unlikely, given the British government’s intention 
to repatriate regulatory sovereignty from the EU). However, fourty years 
of regulatory integration may certainly help tackling (actual or potential) 
regulatory diversity going forward. Excluding some of the instruments 
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for deeper integration (such as supranational regulation, supervision and 
enforcement), the following two (interlinked) options should be 
considered for the service chapter of the future UK-EU FTA: 
– A first option is to provide for the recognition of equivalence. Such 
provision would require each party to accept a qualification or license 
obtained by a service provider in its home State as equivalent to the 
qualification or license necessary to provide services in the territory of 
that party (the host State) at least as long as the home State objectively 
demonstrates that the home State’s qualification or license achieve the 
host State’s regulatory objectives11. While trade agreements generally 
allow contracting parties to agree on the recognition of their respective 
requirements, at least in services, they do not require them to grant such 
recognition12. Accordingly, a mandatory recognition of equivalence 
would certainly be an ambitious option. 
– A second option is to encourage harmonisation through reference 
to existing international standards and/or establishment of regulatory 
cooperation between the two contracting parties. With regard to 
international standards, for example, the FTA may require that both 
contracting parties adhere to any specific international standards (as 
trade agreements do when it comes to technical and sanitary measures 
affecting trade in goods) and provide a justification whenever a party 
                     
11 A similar clause features in current EU law with regard to the provision of certain 
financial services by suppliers based outside the EU (ie., having third-country status). A 
similar clause can also be found in the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures, which requires Members to accept the SPS measures of other 
Members as equivalent, even if these measures differ from their own, at least as long as 
the exporting Member «objectively demonstrates to the importing Member that its 
measures achieve the importing Member’s appropriate level of SPS protection». See 
Article 4.1 SPS Agreement. 
12 See Article VII GATS, which provides that, for purposes of the fulfilment of its 
standards or criteria for the authorization, licensing or certification of service suppliers, 
«a Member may recognize the education or experience obtained, requirements met, or 
licenses or certification granted in a particular country». 
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decides to diverge, even partially, from such standard13. The FTA may 
also require that compliance with any such international standards will 
guarantee (or expedite) the recognition of equivalence mentioned above. 
With regard to regulatory cooperation, the future UK-EU FTA could 
build upon recent FTAs that focus on encouraging contracting parties to 
cooperate in the development, formulation, modification of their 
respective domestic regulation. Chapter 21 of the EU-Canada CETA, for 
example, deals with ‘Regulatory Cooperation’ and applies to the 
«development, review and methodological aspects of regulatory measures 
of the Parties’ regulatory authorities» affecting both trade in goods and 
services. While Chapter 21 CETA adopts soft/best endeavour language, 
the future UK-EU FTA could take a harder/binding approach to 
regulatory cooperation. Furthermore, regulatory cooperation can also 
facilitate and/or be a condition of the above mentioned recognition of 
equivalence. 
All these options addressing regulatory diversity may apply across the 
board or to specific service sectors, only. As mentioned above, trade 
agreements often provide for specific disciplines applicable to different 
service sectors or sub-sectors (whether in distinct chapters or in distinct 
sections of the agreement), and a similar approach is likely and very 
much desirable for a future UK-EU FTA. 
 
4. And three challenges 
 
First, negotiating an FTA will require reaching a fair balance between 
gains and losses among the negotiating parties. The exchange of benefits may 
take place across different service sectors or between goods and services. 
For example, in the Uruguay round of trade negotiations, which lead to 
                     
13 One recent example in trade in goods is found in Annex 2-B on Motor Vehicles and 
Parts Thereof in the EU-Singapore FTA expressly identifying the relevant international 
standards for purposes of regulatory convergence. 
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the establishment of the WTO, it is often said that developing countries 
accepted disciplines on trade in services and trade-related intellectual 
property rights in exchange for concession on textiles and agriculture by 
developed countries. In the case of the future UK-EU FTA, the baseline 
is represented by the level of liberalisation commitment that would exist 
following Brexit without a bilateral trade agreement (ie., WTO terms). 
Accordingly, if liberalisation in financial services will be more 
advantageous to the UK (because of its current competitive advantage 
vis-à-vis the EU), the EU will demand, and expect to receive, an at least 
equivalent advantage in a different service or product sector (say 
transport or agriculture). 
Second, the negotiation of a future UK-EU FTA will need to take in 
to account any existing (as well as future) most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
obligations undertaken by the UK and the EU with third countries. While 
any preferential treatment granted in a future UK-EU FTA will be able 
to rely on the broad exception in Article V GATS for regional economic 
integrations, the same cannot automatically be said for the more limited 
MFN exceptions found in several of the EU FTAs with third countries 
(such as Canada, Vietnam and Korea). For example, in the EU-Canada 
CETA, the MFN reservations applicable to trade in services are limited 
to «any existing or future bilateral or multilateral agreement which: (a) 
creates an internal market in services and investment; (b) grants the right 
of establishment; or (c) requires the approximation of legislation in one 
or more economic sectors» (see Articles 8.15.2 and 9.7.2 and Annex II 
CETA). One wonders whether the future UK-EU FTA will entail any of 
the three above listed scenarios14. 
                     
14 The MFN exception in the EU-Vietnam FTA chapters on trade in services 
(investment and cross-border services) excludes MFN for «(a) any treatment granted as 
part of a process of economic integration, which includes commitments to abolish 
substantially all barriers to investment among the parties to such a process, together 
with the approximation of legislation of the parties on a broad range of matters within 
the purview of this Agreement […] (c) any treatment resulting from measures providing 
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Third, there is a potential conflict between the aim of ensuring ‘the 
freest and most frictionless trade possible in services’, on the one hand, 
and the aim of repatriating regulatory sovereignty, on the other. The 
various options for a future UK-EU FTA highlighted above to address, 
in particular, regulatory diversity in the pursuit of a high level of service 
market integration, will inevitably entail limitations on the ability of the 
UK (and the EU) to regulate services. The key challenge for the UK and 
the EU will be the extent to which the two contracting parties will be able 
to agree on the various mechanisms suggested above in order to facilitate 
trade in services between them. All these various mechanisms (including 
reference to international standards, recognition of equivalence and 
regulatory cooperation) may in fact already be found in existing trade 
agreements. The real novelty and thus ambition will be (a) how many of 
the above mechanisms will actually feature in the future UK-EU FTA, 
(b) how many service sectors will be subject to such mechanisms, and (c) 
whether these mechanisms will be subject to strict obligation or left to 
the contracting parties’ best endeavours. 
 
5. Transitional period 
 
The difficulty of implementing Brexit is greater due to time pressure. 
Given the demands from those supporting Brexit, the British 
government formally notified its decision to leave the Union on 29 
March 2017. According to Article 50, paragraph 3, «[t]he Treaties shall 
cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force 
                     
for the recognition of qualifications, licences or prudential measures in accordance with 
Article VII of the General Agreement on Trade in Services or its Annex on Financial 
Services». A footnote to subparagraph (a) above reads as follows: «Within this 
paragraph and for greater certainty, the ASEAN Economic Community and the 
European Union are falling within this concept of ‘a process of economic integration’» 
(see Article 8.4.5 EU-Vietnam FTA). 
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of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the 
notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in 
agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to 
extend this period». Accordingly, the general understanding is that the 
negotiations with regard to the British withdrawal and the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU, as well as actually 
implementing all the needed changes in the law books as well as on the 
ground, will need to be concluded by 29 March 2019. This is, by every 
view, a very tight schedule. 
The British government has recently recognised the need for a period 
of implementation (or transition) in order «to adjust the new 
arrangements in a smooth and orderly way». While in itself not altogether 
clear, the government’s current thinking with regard to the kind of 
transitional mechanism appears to be aimed at ‘simply’ prolonging the 
current regulatory framework for a (limited) period of time: «a period of 
standstill», in the words of the Prime Minister in her Florence speech. 
This period of standstill would have the added advantage that people, 
businesses and public services would only need to confront one set of 
changes. Accordingly, in an ideal scenario, by 29 March 2019, the UK 
and the EU would have been able to agree on (a) the withdrawal 
agreement concerning in particular three key issues (the rights of EU 
nationals, the Irish border and the divorce bill) and (b) the future long-
term relationship between the UK and the EU or at least the heads of 
terms of such relationship. The period of standstill would then provide 
everyone the time adjust to the new post-Brexit world, or, if needed, to 
add the necessary details to the agreement on the future relationship. 
When it comes to actually devising a transitional framework several 
options have been put forward including, for example, rejoining the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and free ride on the 
European Economic Area agreement, extending the negotiating period 
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beyond the 29th March 2019 (as per the last sentence of Article 50(3) 
TFEU), or agree to extend the EU Single Market and its acquis for a 
limited period of time after Brexit. 
Here, I want to suggest one further option that has not yet been fully 
considered. It is based on a textual and purposive interpretation Article 
50(3) TFEU. As noted above, Article 50(3) provides that the treaties 
shall cease to apply to the State in question «from the date of entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the 
notification referred to in paragraph 2» unless the period is extended. 
The suggestion is that the agreement on withdrawal reached at the latest 
by 29 March 2019 will expressly specify that its entry into force will take 
place at a later date (for example, two years later, on 29 March 2021). 
This would have several practical and political implications: (a) by 
postponing its entry into force, the status quo is preserved for the 
chosen period of time, (b) at least formally, it would be subject only to a 
qualified majority vote in the Council and consent of the European 
Parliament pursuant to Article 50(2) TFEU, (c) while Brexit day would 
be effectively postponed, withdrawal from the EU would have been 
finalised, so that at least that part of the negotiations would be over, and 
(d) it would provide additional time to finalise the details of the future, 
more complex relationship (including ratification and implementation by 
the UK and the 27 EU Member States). 
The UK and EU could also agree that in the transitional period 
certain provisions of EU law would be suspended or disapplied (for 
example, the election of the British members to the European 
Parliament in 2019). However, moving away (at least substantially) from 
the status quo may bring about additional legal and political difficulties 
that may not be overcome in the limited time remaining. Pragmatism will 
(need to) dictate the extent of this tinkering. 
Federico Ortino 
 
78 
Does the option suggested here conform with Article 50(3)? I believe 
it does. The crucial question is how one interprets ‘that’ in ‘failing that’. 
Does it mean a negotiated and concluded withdrawal agreement 
pursuant to Article 50(2) albeit one that will not enter into force until a 
later date (which is beyond 29 March 2019)? Or does it mean a 
withdrawal agreement that, while having been concluded, fails to enter 
into force within the two years (that is by 29 March 2019)? I believe that 
there are strong arguments for the former reading. First, ‘that’ must refer 
to the existence of a withdrawal agreement, rather than to the entry into 
force of one such agreement. The Italian and Swedish versions seem to 
support such an interpretation as they read respectively «in mancanza di 
tale accordo» (‘failing such agreement’) and «om det inte finns något sådant 
avtal» (‘if there is no such agreement’)15. If the two years were supposed 
to set the maximum period for the withdrawal to actually happen (with 
or without an exit agreement), the drafters could have easily specified 
that in Article 50(3) with language such as «and at the latest». Equally the 
option of extending the two year period as per the last sentence of 
Article 50(3) only refers to the case no agreement has been reached. It 
does not apply to the scenario where a withdrawal agreement has actually 
been reached but its entry in to force has been postponed to a later date. 
Second, the commentaries to the various (constitutional treaty) drafts 
of what is now Article 50 make clear the underlying rationale of the 
provision on withdrawal. They state in relevant part as follows: «while it 
is desirable that an agreement should be concluded between the Union 
and the withdrawing State on the arrangements for withdrawal and on 
their future relationship, it was felt that such an agreement should not 
                     
15 The French and Spanish versions are similar to the English one. The French version 
of Art 50(3) reads as follows: «Les traités cessent d'être applicables à l’État concerné à 
partir de la date d’entrée en vigueur de l’accord de retrait ou, à défaut, deux ans après la 
notification visée au paragraphe 2, sauf si le Conseil européen, en accord avec l’État 
membre concerné, décide à l’unanimité de proroger ce délai». 
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constitute a condition for withdrawal so as not to void the concept of 
voluntary withdrawal of its substance»16. In other words, the ultimate 
objective of Article 50 is to reach an agreement on withdrawal to ensure 
an orderly exit, while the two-year deadline is there to reassure the 
withdrawing Member that its decision to withdraw from the Union will 
not be ultimately frustrated. Accordingly, the interpretation suggested 
here conforms with both the text and the spirit and purpose of the 
provision. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Rome was not built in a day and neither the EU. While Brexit does 
not have to take as long, it is important to be clear and upfront about the 
challenges facing the country in implementing the decision to leave the 
EU. As the government’s goal should be to follow a Brexit strategy that 
will be acceptable in terms of process and outcome by a large majority of 
the country (thus including parts of those that have voted to remain in 
the EU), this can only be achieved by presenting the challenges facing 
the country in a clear and up-front manner. This will in turn provide 
greater certainty, fewer anxieties and fundamentally a more legitimate 
future relationship with the rest of the EU going forward. 
 
                     
16 Presidium of the European Convention, Title X: Union Membership, CONV 648/03 
(2 April 2003) at 9. 
